![]() That being said though, I'm still not convinced on IPFS because it seems like it cannot handle much and is excessively inefficient (case in point: this article). Or we could just have enough activists that are willing to risk being fined or arrested. If we normalize it enough, there will be too many people hosting and using IPFS for law enforcement to reasonably take down. If not, and you just pin random chunks, then if we normalize people using IPFS and distributing legal data this will be solved. If this machine is taken down, the content goes with it.ĭo you have to explicitly choose what data to pin? If so then this is an issue. > IPFS also requires "pinning", which means that unless other people decide to dedicate a few TB to this out of their own initiative, what we have currently is a single machine providing data through an obscure mechanism. ![]() Maybe there is a way to slightly break the protocol to further hide the requests. Rotate the filenames so so when one is discovered, past requests can't be tracked. ![]() If necessary, the hosts can also encrypt the filenames and data so that, until law enforcement gets the encryption key, they can't know who accesses what (public key and other necessary info would be communicated through Signal). This is bad news for something law enforcement has already taken a serious interest in. To my knowledge, IPFS isn't really private, in that both the nodes hosting content can be easily known, and the users requesting content can be monitored.
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